China's spy agency thinks the worst is over

This is an extraordinary document which contains perhaps the most authoritative description of where China thinks its relationship with the U.S. stands, and where it’s headed.

The report was written by CICIR - the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (中国现代国际关系研究院) - which is the research institute of China’s powerful Ministry of State Security (MSS), basically the CIA and the FBI all wrapped in one.

Furthermore, it was published on chinadiplomacy.org.cn, which is jointly run by CIIS, the research institute of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In other words, you can hardly get closer to the horse's mouth - short of sitting in on a Politburo briefing.

The title of the report is “The Great Global Transformation and the Path to U.S.–China Coexistence” and a full translation is available at the bottom of this article, but in the meanwhile let me highlight what struck me most reading it.

1) China frames its relationship with the U.S. through Mao's protracted war theory

There is an expression used throughout the text that may sound innocent at first glance: the fact that the U.S.-China relationship has entered a new phase of “strategic stalemate” (战略相持).

This is actually an expression coined by Mao Zedong in On Protracted War (论持久战), written over 8 days in Yan'an in May 1938 in reference to the war with Japan. It has - to my knowledge - no other origin in Chinese strategic vocabulary. This is confirmed by Huang Renwei of Fudan University, who explicitly writes: “The concept of 'strategic stalemate phase' was created by Mao Zedong in On Protracted War.”

As Mao put it there are 3 stages to winning a protracted war as a weaker party against a stronger adversary (which was the case of China at the time against Japan):

1. Strategic defense (战略防御), when the weaker side absorbs the stronger side's assault

2. Strategic stalemate (战略相持), when the balance tips toward equilibrium

3. Strategic counteroffensive (战略反攻), when the formerly weaker side takes the initiative and wins

Mao called the stalemate phase the “pivot of the entire war” - the moment when the weaker side “transforms from weak to strong.” It is the hardest and longest stretch, but also the one where the weaker side quietly accumulates the strength that will eventually prove decisive.

Important to note: the application of Maoist protracted war vocabulary to US-China relations isn't CICIR freelancing - it's an established analytical framework in Chinese strategic studies. For proof, Tsinghua University's CISS (Center for International Security and Strategy) published a piece in 2022 - by the same Huang Renwei mentioned above - in which he says that “the US-China strategic stalemate phase could last up to 30 years.”

So how is this expression used in the CICIR text?

The report states plainly that “US-China competition has moved from the preliminary stalemate of Trump's first term into a new phase of comprehensive stalemate” (中美博弈由特朗普一任时的初步相持进入全面相持的新阶段).

Read through Mao's framework, the narrative is unmistakable. Stage one - strategic defense - is well and truly over after years of American offensive: Trump's first-term trade war, Biden's tech embargo and alliance-building, or the 145% tariffs of 2025. The report describes China as having absorbed all of this - “united, daring to fight and skilled at fighting” (众志成城、敢斗善斗) - and come through it intact.

Interestingly, the report describes the Americans as agreeing the balance has shifted: the report quotes the US's own National Security Strategy calling the relationship one between “near-peers,” Trump himself calling it “G2” and Rubio acknowledging a “strategic stability point.”

Put simply: China's intelligence establishment largely believes the storm has been weathered, the U.S.’s best punch has already landed.

2) The U.S. is no longer an active threat - it's a manageable condition

Anyone used to reading such reports on the U.S. by Chinese institutions - all the more one affiliated with the MSS - will tell you: they’re typically permeated with a heavy dose of threat perception, a lingering fear that the US might still find a way to derail China's rise. To speak bluntly, the common theme used to be: “we just know they’ll try to f*ck us over and we need to be hypervigilant.”

That’s what’s striking in this document: this is gone.

The U.S. is still described as having engaged in 遏制打压 (containment and suppression), but in the past tense, as something China absorbed and survived. Again, the strategic defense phase is over.

In fact, the document is very explicit about this: it advocates that China, when it comes to the U.S., moves from 应急式灭火 ("emergency firefighting") to 常态化风险管理 ("normalized risk management"). You don’t normalize a worrying threat, only something that you’re comfortable is no longer one.

Why is China so confident about this? Because of a concept I keep repeating but that, judging from comments here and on X, many folks still struggle with: power is not about what you WANT to do, but about what you CAN do.

Reading the document, the implication is clear: the U.S. can no longer achieve its strategic objectives against China. It’s not that they don’t want to contain and suppress China - they’d love nothing more - it’s that they CANNOT. The harm the U.S. can inflict is real but symmetrical and self-defeating: 合则两利、斗则俱伤 - “cooperation benefits both, conflict injures both.” The framing is that the US can still cause pain but can no longer translate that pain into strategic advantage. And crucially, China proved this empirically - it took everything the US threw at it (trade war, tech embargo, 145% tariffs) and came through with its economy, its system, and its trajectory intact, something the document keeps emphasizing.

There is - incidentally - a fascinating mirror image here with the U.S.'s own National Security Strategy, which I analyzed in depth in December. In that document, the U.S. quietly moved from “how do we change China?” to “how do we live with a China we cannot change?” - abandoning the language of civilizational contest and replacing it with the vocabulary of commercial competition and risk management. The CICIR document performs the exact same operation in reverse: it moves from “how do we survive the U.S.?” to “how do we manage the U.S.?”

Both sides, it seems, have arrived at the same conclusion: that the other is no longer a problem to be solved but a condition to be lived with. The difference is in the emotional register: Washington's version reads like weary resignation, Beijing's like quiet satisfaction.

To be clear the document doesn't describe the U.S. as harmless - it still warns of “风高浪急甚至惊涛骇浪” (high winds and rough seas, even towering waves) and the Taiwan section retains genuinely sharp edges. But the threat is now about accidents, not design. China no longer fears that America has a realistic strategy to undermine it, it fears that America might blunder into a confrontation without one.

3) The MSS's six-step relationship recovery program

So, if China says the U.S. is to be managed and the U.S. says China is to be lived with, then someone has to write a relationship recovery program. China (well, CICIR) has taken the liberty of drafting one.

It comes in six parts at the end of the document and, to be honest, if you swapped “China” and “the United States” for “husband” and “wife,” it’d read exactly like your standard handout from a marriage therapist.

The six parts - marriage therapist version:

1. Define the relationship: the document actually uses the phrase 做伙伴、成朋友: “be partners, become friends,” which sounds less like something written by China’s Ministry of State Security and more like a Californian couples therapist after her third kombucha.

2. Stop using the kids as leverage: Taiwan. China's position is that reunification is inevitable and the US needs to stop encouraging the child's rebellious phase. Every other item on the therapist’s list is pointless if this one goes wrong.

3. Learn to communicate like adults: regularized dialogue mechanisms across economics, diplomacy, law enforcement, and military with “safety valves.” In therapy terms: stop slamming the door and then pretending the other person doesn't exist for six months.

4. Find shared hobbies: green energy, counter-narcotics, AI governance - the geopolitical equivalent of “have you tried a cooking class?” Things for which the document says both sides need to see “tangible benefits.” The therapist knows you need some wins.

5. Fight fair: a risk prevention framework that keeps disagreements from “hijacking the overall relationship.” The document calls it a “shock absorber.” The therapist would call it “not bringing up the spy balloon every time someone forgets to do the dishes.”

6. Spend time with each other's families and friends: restore people-to-people exchange, clear the visa backlogs, add flights. The last sentence is actually beautifully crafted so I’ll quote it verbatim: “Only when the peoples of both countries truly come to know each other and benefit from such exchange can the popular foundation for the healthy development of U.S.–China relations be continuously strengthened, weathering any storm.”

The couples therapy framing is mine, obviously - but the substance underneath it is both serious and, in places, genuinely conciliatory. China is proposing mutual guardrails that would constrain its own behavior too, accepting incrementalism over maximalism, and closing with a call for ordinary people to lead the way. For a document produced by the MSS's research arm - which, as a reminder, is all about China’s security - that's remarkably open-handed. Whether Washington is willing to meet that halfway is another question entirely.

There is, however, one tension running through this document that I want to end on - because I think it’s the most important thing to notice.

Everything in sections two and three points toward genuine coexistence: guardrails, shared hobbies, people-to-people exchange, the language of partnership. But everything in section one points somewhere else. Remember: in Mao’s framework, the stalemate is not an end state. It is stage two of three. Stage three is the strategic counteroffensive - when the formerly weaker side prevails.

So what is this document actually proposing? Permanent coexistence between equals? Or the optimal strategy for the stalemate phase - the patient accumulation of strength?

Or perhaps there is no contradiction. Perhaps China’s version of “winning” stage three doesn’t look like confrontation at all - it looks like a world that has quietly reorganized itself around Chinese centrality, not through conquest but through competence, not through coercion but through the slow gravitational pull of being the larger economy, the bigger manufacturer, the more indispensable partner. A world where coexistence is real, but on terms very much acceptable to Beijing.

If so, this document isn’t naive and it isn’t deceptive. It’s something more interesting: a sincere offer of partnership from a country that believes it is becoming the senior partner. The counteroffensive might simply be what happens when you let gravity do the work.

---

Full translation of “The Great Global Transformation and the Path to U.S.–China Coexistence”

Source: China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), published May 13, 2026 on chinadiplomacy.org.cn. Translated from Chinese.

Today’s world is witnessing the accelerated unfolding of transformations unseen in a century, with the international landscape characterized by an intertwining of change and turbulence. More than ever, the international community needs a U.S.–China relationship that is strategic, constructive, and stable—one that can provide the most precious stability and certainty for a world in upheaval. As for the relationship itself, since the normalization process was set in motion over half a century ago, U.S.–China relations have weathered many storms and entered a new phase of strategic stalemate. Both countries urgently need to chart a path of proper coexistence suited to the new realities of the relationship. To this end, the Institute of American Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations established a research task force. Grounded in the great global transformation and the new phase of U.S.–China relations, the task force has sought to explore how to build a constructive and strategically stable framework, guiding the two major powers toward mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation.

---

I

The great transformation unseen in a century constitutes the first logical premise for our thinking about the proper path to U.S.–China coexistence. At present, changes in the world, changes of the era, and changes of history are unfolding in unprecedented ways. Charting the proper course for U.S.–China relations in this new period is an integral part of responding to this once-in-a-century transformation.

The first salient manifestation of this global transformation is the transition of the international order. The current order has entered a “transitional period” in which the old order is disintegrating while a new order has yet to take shape. The so-called “liberal international order” that underpinned the functioning of the international system after the Cold War has collapsed. The American foreign policy scholar Richard Haass has argued that one important reason for the decline of the “liberal international order” is that the United States—the order’s principal architect and guardian—has itself begun to deviate from the system it created. Historical experience shows that major transitions of the international order are often fraught with conflict, even war. The most recent such transitions were all completed in the aftermath of great wars—the “Versailles–Washington System” established after World War I, the “Yalta System” established after World War II, and so on. The turbulence that inevitably accompanies the transition between old and new orders is something the international community does not wish to see. Whether the two great powers, China and the United States, can find a path of mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation during this transitional period is a matter that bears on the peace of humanity and the future of the world.

Another salient manifestation of the global transformation is the continued deepening of the world’s peace deficit, development deficit, security deficit, and governance deficit. At the very start of 2026, the “Venezuela Incident” erupted, followed immediately by the outbreak of hostilities involving the United States, Israel, and Iran. Hegemonism and power politics are intensifying the “law of the jungle” in international affairs, exacerbating regional conflicts, and bringing ever more instability and uncertainty to the world. Today, the Russia–Ukraine conflict has yet to subside and the wars in the Middle East continue to spill over. Tensions in the Strait of Hormuz are pulling on global market expectations in the energy, shipping, chemical, and food sectors, with security risks continuing to diffuse through supply chains, financial markets, and public expectations. As the two most consequential powers in the world, China and the United States have a duty to bring greater stability and certainty to a world in turmoil. The pursuit of a proper path to U.S.–China coexistence meets the shared expectations of the international community against the backdrop of this once-in-a-century transformation.

Yet another salient manifestation of the global transformation is the revolutionary advance of technology. A new technological revolution—led by artificial intelligence, quantum computing, blockchain, biotechnology, and more—is giving rise to new industries, new business models, and new paradigms. It is profoundly reshaping both people’s daily lives and international relations, creating entirely new development opportunities for all countries while also posing entirely new risk challenges for the world. The development of artificial intelligence is a case in point: it is both a key driver of the new round of technological revolution and a new source of security risks. The 2026 International AI Safety Report noted that the capabilities of general-purpose AI systems are advancing rapidly and that their risk management has become a global issue. In April, the United States released, on a limited basis, the frontier AI model “Mythos,” partially confirming these concerns. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman recently wrote that “the emerging risks arising from asymmetric cyber threats posed by agentic AI systems” constitute “a common enemy of China and the United States,” and that “our fates are now fused together.” The loss of control over AI could trigger new security challenges across multiple domains—nuclear, biological, informational, financial, and societal-cognitive—yet only China and the United States possess sufficient capability, resources, and convening power to drive the international community toward an effective governance framework. In this sense, charting the proper path to U.S.–China coexistence is also a necessary choice for confronting shared threats amid the great global transformation.

---

II

The entry of U.S.–China strategic competition into a new phase of strategic stalemate constitutes the second logical premise for our thinking about the proper path to coexistence. Historical experience with great-power competition shows that the strategic stalemate phase often subjects bilateral relations to severe tests—high winds and rough seas, even towering waves. Mismanaged, the relationship faces a grave risk of capsizing. How China and the United States coexist during this phase of strategic stalemate is a matter of consequence not only for both nations but for the entire world.

The shift in the balance of power is the first major cause and defining feature of this new phase. During the “14th Five-Year Plan” period, China’s economic strength increased markedly, its scientific and technological innovation produced abundant results, its cultural undertakings and industries flourished, its national security capabilities were effectively enhanced, the modernization of its national defense and armed forces made major strides, and its composite national power reached a new level. China’s development model and institutional advantages have also won growing recognition from the international community, including from the United States. The United States, for its part, while still maintaining formidable composite national power, has seen a relative decline in both its hard and soft power compared to the “indisputable unipolar hegemony” of the early 21st century. The U.S. National Security Strategy of 2025 acknowledged that the relationship between China and the United States had shifted from what was once “a relationship between a mature, wealthy economy and one of the world’s poorest countries” to one between “near-peers.” President Trump even referred to the U.S.–China relationship at one point as the “G2.”

The deep intertwining of interests and complex interdependence represent another major cause and defining feature of this new phase. Unlike the nearly parallel U.S.–Soviet relationship of the Cold War era, China and the United States are increasingly developing an economic and trade relationship that is at once complementary, mutually beneficial, and symbiotic, while also being “susceptible to being leveraged and disrupted by the other side.” In 2025, China resolutely opposed and forcefully countered the United States’ unprecedented tariff coercion, with bilateral tariffs at one point reaching 145% and bilateral trade volume recording its steepest decline since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979. Yet amid the high winds and rough seas, U.S.–China economic and trade ties once again demonstrated remarkable resilience. According to the customs statistics of both countries, in 2025, China’s imports from and exports to the United States accounted for 8.8% of China’s total foreign trade, while U.S. trade with China accounted for 7.8% of America’s total foreign trade. As the world’s two largest economies, China and the United States remain—and will for a long time continue to be—each other’s most important trading partners.

China’s exercise of historical initiative—seeking cooperation through struggle and stability through struggle—is also an important factor driving U.S.–China strategic competition into its new phase. The year 2025 held landmark significance for U.S.–China relations. After the inauguration of the second Trump administration, the United States launched a rapid succession of moves against China—frequent in action, fast in tempo, and heavy-handed in execution. Under the strong leadership of the CPC Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core, the Chinese people united as one, daring to struggle and adept at doing so, meeting America’s containment and suppression with firm resolve, ample confidence, and steady steps, uprightly safeguarding China’s legitimate rights and interests and achieving a phased stabilization of U.S.–China relations—halting the decline and steadying the course. The strategic competition between China and the United States thus moved from the preliminary stalemate of Trump’s first term into a new phase of comprehensive stalemate.

Against this backdrop, mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation between the two countries are both an objective imperative and a rational choice.

First, mutual respect is inherent to honestly facing the reality of strategic stalemate. The entry of U.S.–China competition into a new phase of strategic stalemate means that the two sides’ strength is converging and that each holds both offensive and defensive advantages vis-à-vis the other—each is “a rival worthy of the other’s respect.” In the past, because the United States was accustomed to dealing with China from a position of strength, mutual respect was largely a unilateral Chinese aspiration. Today, it is increasingly becoming a shared demand. China and the United States differ in their histories and cultures, social systems, and development paths—a long-standing objective reality. Yet this did not prevent the two countries from moving from the hostility and isolation of the early Cold War toward normalization, and then toward the broad and deep ties—mutually beneficial, win-win, and beneficial to the world—that they subsequently developed. One key lesson from this experience is respect for each other’s core interests. For U.S.–China relations to be stable, the most fundamental requirement is to respect each other’s territorial sovereignty, social systems, and development paths, and to refrain from imposing one’s own will and model on the other. In particular, the United States, as the stronger party, must not constantly seek to “shape” China’s strategic environment or even attempt to “change China” through maximum pressure. The Taiwan question is the core of China’s core interests and the very foundation of the political basis of U.S.–China relations. If the U.S. side is ambiguous or even regressive in its policy stance on Taiwan and sends wrong signals to “Taiwan independence” separatist forces, then mutual respect between China and the United States is out of the question. In July 2025, U.S. Secretary of State Rubio publicly emphasized the importance of sustaining the relationship with China and stated that “the United States seeks a relationship of mutual respect with China”—a constructive statement, though whether it can truly be implemented remains contingent on American actions.

Second, peaceful coexistence is an intrinsic requirement for mitigating the risks of strategic stalemate. During the phase of strategic stalemate, U.S.–China relations will face severe tests—high winds and rough seas, even towering waves. The probability of conflict between the two countries is rising, and should China and the United States stumble into an armed clash or confrontation, both nations and the world would suffer. When China and the United States cooperate, both benefit; when they clash, both lose. The two economies are enormous and their interests deeply intertwined. A conflict or confrontation would not only inflict massive losses on the peoples of both countries but would also destabilize global industrial and supply chains, trigger multiple crises in energy, food, and security, and drag down the global economic recovery. In today’s world of frequent geopolitical conflicts and conspicuous global security fragility, the majority of nations are unwilling to take sides between China and the United States, and still less do they wish to see a U.S.–China confrontation plunge international peace and stability into “unbearable harm.” China and the United States have only the responsibility to uphold peace and cooperation, not any justification for conflict and confrontation. Adhering to peaceful coexistence means maintaining the baseline of no conflict and no confrontation, and opposing the use of force for coercion and the formation of opposing blocs. It means continuously keeping channels of communication open, refining crisis management mechanisms, and properly managing differences and disagreements. At the same time, both China and the United States should be highly vigilant against dangerous trends—including attempts by “Taiwan independence” separatist forces to seek independence through military means and the ambitions of right-wing forces in Japan to revive militarism—preventing those with ulterior motives from exploiting chaos for gain, and jointly and resolutely safeguarding the postwar international order.

Third, win-win cooperation is the goal that China and the United States should pursue as they move into the future. In the era of globalization, the interests of China and the United States are deeply intertwined. In numerous areas involving bilateral and even global shared interests—trade and economics, climate change, public health, counterterrorism, nonproliferation, and more—both sides have a strong foundation for cooperation and broad room for collaboration. U.S.–China relations have never been a zero-sum game in which one side’s gain is the other’s loss or one side’s rise means the other’s decline; mutual benefit and win-win outcomes are the essential nature of the relationship. Relentlessly pursuing “my country first” policies, imposing decoupling, erecting trade barriers, and resorting to containment and suppression fundamentally go against the tide of globalization. In the end, such policies harm others without benefiting oneself, and harming others ultimately harms oneself—this is decidedly not the proper path to coexistence. History has demonstrated that U.S.–China cooperation can accomplish many great, practical, and beneficial things for both countries and the world. Looking ahead, if the two countries are to achieve truly constructive strategic stability, they cannot do without joining hands and continuously advancing win-win cooperation. Under the new circumstances, the two countries bear a special responsibility for meeting global challenges and have even stronger reasons than before to pursue mutual benefit and win-win results. Areas such as combating illegal immigration and telecommunications fraud, anti-money laundering, artificial intelligence, and responding to infectious diseases are all important fields with promising prospects for U.S.–China cooperation, where both sides can and should do more.

---

III

China has consistently worked toward building a constructive and strategically stable new model of major-power relations between China and the United States. On November 16, 2021, when President Xi Jinping held a virtual meeting with President Biden, he put forward the three principles for U.S.–China relations—”mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation”—setting the tone for how the two countries should properly engage with each other. On November 16, 2024, when President Xi Jinping met with President Biden in Lima, he underscored four red lines—”the Taiwan question, democracy and human rights, the path and system of governance, and the right to development”—delineating boundaries for how the two countries should manage their differences, prevent misjudgment, and avoid conflict and confrontation. On November 15, 2023, when President Xi Jinping met with President Biden in San Francisco, he proposed five pillars—”jointly fostering the right strategic perception, jointly managing differences effectively, jointly advancing mutually beneficial cooperation, jointly shouldering great-power responsibilities, and jointly promoting people-to-people exchange”—providing the structural framework for how the two countries could realize a shared vision. These Chinese proposals offer an important framework for the proper path to U.S.–China coexistence in the new era.

Having undergone repeated trial and error through the “trade war,” the “tech war,” and geopolitical competition, the U.S. side, too, has begun to recognize that a framework-level approach to U.S.–China coexistence serves the needs of both countries and meets the expectations of the international community. In the January 4, 2026 phone call between the two heads of state, President Trump stated that “the United States and China are both great nations, and the U.S.–China relationship is the most important bilateral relationship in the world.” In his media remarks on February 25, 2026, Secretary of State Rubio described U.S.–China relations as having reached a “point of strategic stability,” emphasizing the critical importance of maintaining open communication channels and avoiding conflict arising from miscalculation. At the Reagan National Defense Forum in December 2025, Secretary of Defense Hegseth stated that the United States “does not intend to contain China’s growth,” nor does it seek to “dominate or humiliate” China or to alter the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, and that the Trump administration seeks to develop “a relationship of stable peace, fair trade, and mutual respect” with China. All of this indicates that, at the present juncture, building the proper path to U.S.–China coexistence rests on a certain foundation of consensus between the two sides and that objective conditions of possibility, necessity, and urgency exist for doing so.

At present, although U.S.–China relations have “halted their decline and steadied their course,” the foundation remains relatively fragile. Many structural disagreements and issues between the two countries cannot be swiftly resolved in the short term—this is an objective reality. Consequently, the pursuit of the proper path to U.S.–China coexistence need not and cannot be “accomplished in a single stroke.” All that is required is continuous forward progress in the right direction. As President Xi Jinping emphasized in his most recent phone call with President Trump: “One thing at a time, continuously building mutual trust, and finding the proper path to coexistence.” With this in mind, the task force believes that, building upon the foundation of principles, red lines, and structural pillars, the proper path to U.S.–China coexistence can be further enriched by focusing on the following six new elements.

First, articulate a new positioning for U.S.–China relations. Positioning is the reference point for the steady and far-reaching development of this major-power relationship. Both countries need to view each other from a strategic height and long-term perspective, advancing U.S.–China relations beyond the stage of “halting the decline and steadying the course.” At its core, this means clearly defining a state of engagement in which both sides “act as partners and become friends,” reaffirming the red lines and bottom lines that neither may cross, avoiding strategic miscalculation that could slide into conflict and confrontation, and striving through positive interactions to achieve more constructive outcomes.

Second, seek new progress on the Taiwan question. The Taiwan question is the very foundation of the political basis of U.S.–China relations and an uncrossable red line. The U.S. side should understand that the reunification of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is a historical inevitability, the shared aspiration of all Chinese people, and the overwhelming popular will. It should also fully recognize the true nature and dangers of “Taiwan independence” separatist forces, translate its commitment of not supporting “Taiwan independence” into concrete action, and avoid causing devastating damage to U.S.–China relations. Both sides should work together to advance the Taiwan question toward its eventual resolution, consolidating the foundation for the long-term development of bilateral relations.

Third, build new bridges for communication and dialogue. Maintaining open channels of communication is the “infrastructure” of managing a major-power relationship. The two countries need to further enrich and refine a series of regularized and institutionalized dialogue mechanisms across the economic and trade, diplomatic, law enforcement, and even military domains, establishing sustainable problem-solving pathways and installing “safety valves” for constructive competition between the two countries. At the same time, they should restore and further expand multifaceted exchanges at the levels of academia, localities, businesses, and think tanks, adding brick by brick to the edifice of mutual understanding and mutual learning.

Fourth, expand new areas of practical cooperation. Cooperation is the endogenous driving force bringing the two great powers closer together. The expansion of the cooperative agenda should focus on practical issues where both sides’ interests converge, enabling stakeholders in both countries to see tangible benefits. The two countries are fully capable of achieving new breakthroughs in areas that have already shown cooperative potential, such as green and low-carbon development, energy transition, and counter-narcotics law enforcement. Building on this, both sides could also explore cooperation on global challenges such as AI governance and public health, continuously expanding the shared pie and injecting positive energy into bilateral relations.

Fifth, build a new framework for risk prevention. Risk prevention is the shock absorber for the steady and far-reaching development of this major-power relationship. This framework is dedicated to keeping disagreements manageable and risks predictable, with the aim of making U.S.–China relations more resilient—shifting from “emergency firefighting” to “normalized risk management.” The emphasis should be on establishing practical and effective “guardrails” for high-risk issues such as economic and trade friction, technology competition, and the situation in the Taiwan Strait, using institutionalized mechanisms to confine disagreements within limited bounds and prevent contradictions in specific areas from spilling over without limit and thereby hijacking the overall relationship.

Sixth, consolidate new foundations of people-to-people friendship. People-to-people friendship is the bedrock of this major-power relationship. The foundation of U.S.–China relations lies in the people, hope lies with the people, the future lies with the youth, and vitality lies at the local level. Both countries need to continue expanding exchanges and cooperation in education, youth engagement, culture, and sports, proactively removing practical obstacles to the movement of people—such as visa and flight restrictions—and creating more institutionalized platforms for people-to-people exchange. Only when the peoples of both countries truly come to know each other and benefit from such exchange can the popular foundation for the healthy development of U.S.–China relations be continuously strengthened, weathering any storm.

---

Conclusion

Against the backdrop of increasingly frequent interactions between the heads of state, 2026 has the potential to become a “new starting point” for a U.S.–China relationship that is more constructive, more strategic, and more stable. While U.S.–China relations cannot return to the past, they can find a proper mode of engagement and a promising future. We believe that as long as both sides adhere to the consensus reached by the two leaders, maintain the positive momentum of dialogue, and translate the warmth of this “new starting point” into sustained action—addressing one issue at a time and steadily accumulating trust and momentum—U.S.–China relations will have the capacity to transcend their differences, avoid conflict, and find the proper path to coexistence, for the greater benefit of both peoples and of the world.